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1. Introduction 
An audit of the financial statements involves the collection and evaluation of evidence 
to determine whether a firm’s financial statements are fairly stated (IAASB 2007a). Essential 
to this process is how auditors select evidence and determine whether the accumulated 
evidence is sufficient to make critical decisions. While much is known about the 
effectiveness and efficiency with which auditors evaluate a given set of evidence (as 
reviewed by Nelson and Tan (2005)) and, to a lesser extent, the type of evidence auditors 
search for in constructing the evidence set (Asare, Trompeter, and Wright 2000), very little is 
known about how auditors decide that there is sufficient evidence upon which to make their 
judgment. That is, how do auditors decide to suspend the search for information and make a 
judgment?   
A stopping rule is a mechanism or decision process whereby the decision maker 
chooses to stop the search for information, finalise the evidence set and make a decision 
(Gigerenzer and Selten 2001). Stopping rules may be relatively simple, such as stopping after 
collecting a predetermined number of evidence items or relatively mechanistic such as the 
completion of a standard checklist. They can also be much more complex, such as 
constructing a mental model of the audit client and comparing that mental model to one’s 
past experiences to determine whether any piece of the mental model is inconsistent with 
these experiences (Bell, Peecher, and Solomon 2005). When using a mental model, the 
auditor stops searching for information when there are no inconsistencies.  
The incorrect selection and/or application of a stoping rule have the potential to 
adversely impact on audit effectiveness and efficiency. Too little audit evidence may result in 
the non-detection of a material misstatement, too much and the audit may be inefficient and 
unprofitable. Even if auditors, through training and experience, are able to accurately and 
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efficiently evaluate audit evidence in order to reach a correct conclusion, those efforts will be 
thwarted if the evidence set generated by the application of a stopping rule is sub-optimal. 
Despite the fundamental importance of stopping rules for an effective and efficient 
audit, very little is known about how auditors use stopping rules. Indeed, we are aware of 
only one paper that investigates the impact of stopping rules in an audit context. Gillett and 
Peytcheva (2007) found that audit conclusions were dependent on the stopping rule that the 
auditors believed was employed to collect the audit evidence. These authors, however, do not 
examine either the selection or application of the stopping rule. 
Using verbal protocol analysis, experienced auditors (Seniors and Mmanagers), and a 
detailed task involving the identification of significant risks at the planning stage of the audit, 
our study begins to address this deficiency in the literature. 
Our results revealed that auditors do not use a single stopping rule, but rather a hybrid 
combination with the development of a mental model of the entity and its operations at the 
core. This is consistent with the requirements of auditing standards (IAASB 2007b) in that 
auditors are using a mental model based approach to collect evidence, build an understanding 
of the client and decide when enough is known about the client in order to stop and make a 
judgment to the client’s significant risks. Although the use of different stopping rules did not 
influence the characteristics of the evidence set generated, greater use of mental model 
stopping rules seems to lead to more effective interpretation and evaluation of the evidence 
set. Moreover, our results reveal that there is a relationship between task-specific experience, 
use of a mental model stopping rule and superior performance in the identification of 
significant risks. 
The introduction of a decision aid in this study, a checklist that provided a 
mechanistic and ‘safe’ alternative to an auditor’s individual and potentially inferior stopping 
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rule did not interfere with the way in which the task was performed. Most participants 
ignored the checklist and a few used it as a review tool at the end of the task. 
Our study provides a theoretical contribution to the stopping rule literature by 
examining what stopping rules are used in more critical and unstructured decision making 
situations. The limited research to date (for example Nickles (1995)) has examined stopping 
rules in simple information search tasks with decisions made by students. A contribution is 
also made to the literature on behavioural decision theory by examining how common 
characteristics of the audit environment (the task-specific experience of auditors and the use 
of checklist decision aids) affect the stopping rules used by auditors and how those rules are 
used to generate sets of sufficient and appropriate evidence for decision making.  
A practical contribution is made by examining the impact of checklists on the 
application by auditors of stopping rules and risk identification. This provides guidance on 
when checklists should be used. A regulatory contribution is made by providing evidence on 
what approaches auditors are using to collect sufficient and appropriate evidence to gather an 
understanding of the client as mandated by International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 315, 
Understanding the Entity and Its Environment and Assessing the Risks of Material 
Misstatement (IAASB 2007b).  
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. Section II provides background to 
the use and different types of stopping rules. Section III outlines the research questions 
examined. Section IV details the methodology employed with Section V reporting the results. 
Section VI provides summary and concluding remarks. 
2. Stopping rules 
2.1. Background 
The stopping rule plays a vital part in the decision making process. Without a rule to 
decide when the information search should be terminated, the search could theoretically 
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continue forever. The effort-accuracy framework (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993) 
implies that decision makers have a means by which to stop the search for information as part 
of their overall decision strategy but does not specify what stopping rules are available.  
Stopping rules have two origins in the literature. First, from psychological research in 
the area titled ‘deferred decision making’ or ‘optional stopping’ (Busemeyer and Rapoport 
1988; Pitz, Reinhold, and Geller 1969) and second, from the area of ‘decision heuristics’ 
(Gigerenzer and Selten 2001). Deferred decision making refers to situations where the 
decision maker must decide whether to search for additional information (at cost) or stop and 
make the decision required (Pitz, Reinhold, and Geller 1969). The decision heuristics 
literature is based on the premise that because of the bounded rationality of humans (Simon 
1957), we use heuristics to in decision making rather than complex, mathematical-based 
models seen in the deferred decision making literature (Gigerenzer and Selten 2001). 
Gigerenzer (2001) posits that human decision making consists of a toolbox of strategies, 
those for searching for information, to stop the search for information and to make a decision 
based on the information gathered.  
2.2. Types of stopping rules 
Nickles (1995) and Browne and Pitts (2004) provides a set of cognitively manageable 
stopping rules for use in deferred decision making research. These stopping rules fall into 
three distinct categories. The first are rules based on judging whether evidence meets a 
certain threshold. The second is a rule that involves the generation of a mental representation 
or model. The third is a rule that involves the creation of a mental list. 
A threshold stopping rule can use any particular measure for the value of evidence. It 
involves the ongoing collection of evidence until such time that a predetermined level is 
reached (magnitude threshold) or the marginal contribution of the most recent evidence item 
falls to a predetermined level (difference threshold). For example, application of the 
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magnitude threshold stopping rule may involve the collection of a predetermined number of 
evidence items or the achievement of a certain level of confidence before the search for 
evidence will stop. The application of the difference threshold stopping rule may involve 
checking that enough new knowledge is gained from a piece of evidence to continue the 
search, if the new knowledge falls below a predetermined level then the search for 
information is stopped. 
The mental model stopping rule involves the decision maker developing arguments 
that are mental representations of the decision problem. For example, the auditor collects 
information to construct a model of the audit client. They compare this information to what 
they know about clients in general (from previous experience). The comparison between the 
client and past experience may indicate an area of the client mental model that is 
contradictory to general business practice. This indicates to the auditor that the mental model 
is not stable or complete and further evidence in the area of contradiction needs to be 
collected before the evidence search can be terminated. Once contradictions are resolved, 
either by understanding why there is a contradiction or establishing that there is, in fact, no 
contradiction, the auditor’s mental model of the client is in harmony with what they know 
both about the client and the environment within which the client operates. When the 
decision maker keeps returning to the same set of arguments or conclusions, the model is 
stable and the information search stops (Yates and Carlson 1982).  
When using the mental list stopping rule, the decision maker develops or accesses a 
list of the evidence items he/she believes is necessary to make the decision. Once all items 
are collected, the search for evidence stops. Mental lists may develop from experience (for 
example, evidence items that must always be considered for the individual auditor to be 
comfortable with their judgment), sourced from items that auditing standards require to be 
considered, and/or from exposure to a firm’s standard audit checklists.  
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3. Research questions 
Prior to discussing the research questions of interest in this study, it is useful to first 
briefly consider the audit context within which the research questions will be examined. 
An informative investigation of stopping rules must take place in an unstructured 
audit environment. Such an environment allows the auditor to guide the search for 
information and be free of any external constraints that may influence when the search stops. 
One unstructured component of the audit is the process by which the auditor gains an 
understanding of the client and identifies the significant risks as part of the planning process. 
This exercise, mandated by auditing standards (IAASB 2007b), is likely to exhibit significant 
variation in the extent of search. The auditing standards do not provide auditors with 
instructions for determining when they have sufficient and appropriate evidence upon which 
to form their judgment. Discussions with professional standards staff at two Australian Big 4 
firms confirmed that this is a task where individual judgment is heavily relied upon. 
Moreover, it is a task for which the list of potential evidence items is almost limitless. As a 
consequence, the identification of significant risks as part of the process by which auditors 
gain an understanding of their client was considered an ideal setting for this study. 
3.1. The relation between the stopping rule used and the evidence collected 
Previous research indicates that people use a range of different stopping rules in their 
decision making (Browne and Pitts 2004; Nickles 1995) and that different stopping rules 
result in differences in the amount of evidence collected (Nickles 1995). What remains an 
unanswered question is whether different stopping rules are more or less effective in the 
generation of an appropriate evidence set. Auditors may adapt to the decision environment 
and be able to generate an appropriate set with any of the three stopping rules. Alternatively, 
one stopping rule may be superior to others. In this regard, the auditing standards (IAASB 
2007b) and one audit firm methodology guide (Bell, Peecher, and Solomon 2005) advocate 
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the mental model approach – with the belief that this results in more sufficient and 
appropriate evidence.  
The mental model stopping rule involves understanding a client in its entirety, 
implying a greater breadth of evidence items. The mental model stopping rule also uses 
pattern-recognition to guide the search for information and when to stop that search. 
Identifying parts of the pattern that are incomplete or inconsistent guides the search for 
information.  
The stopping rules may also interact with the order in which evidence is gathered to 
affect the evidence set. If non-diagnostic evidence is encountered early in the process, the 
search may be prematurely stopped when using the threshold stopping rules. This is due to 
the fact that the magnitude (that is, the predetermined number of evidence items) will be 
reached with evidence of limited relevance (remember it is the magnitude and not the 
informativeness which is important) or the marginal contribution of the evidence collected 
will quickly fall below that necessary for the auditor to continue the search. This will not be 
the case in mental model or mental list stopping rules which are less sensitive to the 
diagnosticity of the evidence encountered. The mental list stopping rule however suffers from 
the fact that it is insensitive to unique or peculiar circumstances. 
There is, therefore, reason to believe that the stopping rule employed might influence 
the quality of the evidence set on which auditors base their judgments. The quality of an 
evidence set generated can be examined in terms of the number of evidence items collected, 
the breadth categories from which evidence is collected, and the depth of items collected 
within each category (Asare, Trompeter, and Wright 2000)1. While previous stopping rule 
studies have examined the number of evidence items collected (Nickles 1995), none have 
investigated the impact of the stopping rule on the breadth and depth of evidence, nor have 
                                                 
1 We discuss these measures of evidence set quality in the Research Method section. 
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they examined the application of stopping rules in complex tasks which characterise the audit 
function. We investigate these issues in the first research question. 
Research Question 1: Is there a relationship between the choice of stopping 
rule and the number, breadth and depth of evidence items in the evidence set 
generated? 
3.2. The relation between the stopping rule used and the identification of significant risks  
It is known that the evidence set presented to the auditor affects decision performance 
(Simnett 1996). Therefore, if the choice of stopping rule affects the evidence set, it also has 
the potential to affect performance. In addition to the generation of the evidence set, the 
choice of stopping rule could influence the way in which the evidence set is evaluated and, in 
doing so, affect performance. This relationship is investigated in the second research 
question.  
Research Question 2: Is there a relationship between the choice of stopping 
rule and the number of significant risks identified?  
3.3. The impact of task-specific experience 
Each stopping rule requires a minimum level of task-specific experience for effective 
use. For example, a graduate auditor with very little experience may not be able to use the 
mental model stopping rule effectively because he or she has under-developed expectations 
about what an audit client should look like (in their mental model). Therefore, their relatively 
simple model may become stable earlier than the more complex and rich model of an auditor 
with greater task-specific experience. This may result in some significant risks not being 
identified. We anticipate that the relationship between task-specific experience and stopping 
rule selection and application to be complex. These complexities are addressed in the 
following discussion. 
Threshold stopping rules can require a range of task-specific experience. For example, 
if the auditor is using a threshold of a particular value or volume of evidence (magnitude 
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threshold), they need sufficient experience to set an appropriate threshold. Too low a 
threshold and the evidence set will be insufficient, too high and the evidence will be 
excessive. However if a difference threshold is used, then experience is unlikely to have the 
same influence. The question to be asked by the auditor is “did I learn anything new?” If the 
marginal contribution to knowledge is above a predetermined level, the evidence search 
continues. The influence of experience will be limited to setting the appropriate marginal 
contribution threshold. 
The successful application of mental model stopping rules requires a high level of 
task-specific experience. Research has indicated that experience improves the problem 
representations (Christ 1993) and mental models (Hammersley 2006) of auditors. Therefore 
the greater the task-specific experience, the more developed the mental model and the greater 
the ability to identify gaps in the mental model and to therefore, continue the search for 
sufficient and appropriate evidence.  
A high level of task-specific experience may also be required for the successful 
application of the mental list stopping rule. If the mental list is developed with experience, 
inexperienced auditors will not have sufficient items included on that checklist. If however 
the mental list comes from memorising either auditing standards or firm-specific checklists, 
then there is likely to be fewer experience related differences in the evidence set generated. 
Auditors may not, however, select the most appropriate stopping rule for their level of 
experience. In this regard, Browne and Pitts (2004) predicted that participants (information 
systems analysts) with greater experience would use the mental list or mental model stopping 
rules. However their results revealed that the majority of participants with a very high level of 
task-specific experience selected a difference threshold stopping rule that requires a very low 
level of task-specific experience for effective execution. As a result, the link between task-
specific experience and the selection of a stopping rule is unclear. 
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Experience may have numerous effects on the selection of stopping rules. Auditors 
with greater task-specific experience may automatically select a more complex rule because 
their cognitive structure is more complex. Or they may have a better-developed effort-
accuracy framework and select a simple rule because it may be as effective as a more 
complex one (as shown in Browne and Pitts (2004)). Auditors with greater task-specific 
experience are also more likely to have received greater feedback on their previous attempts 
at risk identification which can be used to inform future stopping rule choices. 
Auditors with greater task-specific experience may search for information they 
believe is more diagnostic first. This may result in them meeting the appropriate threshold or 
completing their mental model in a relatively shorter period of time compared to those with 
less task-specific experience. It may mean that their evidence set is made up of more 
diagnostic evidence items. If a lesser experienced auditor uses the difference threshold 
stopping rule (ceasing when nothing new is learned), and does not have enough experience to 
know which cues are most diagnostic, then the search for information may be terminated 
after only a few pieces of information are obtained. The evidence set may be insufficient.  
In addition, a particular stopping rule may lead to an appropriate evidence set. 
However, if the auditor has insufficient task-specific experience to be able to identify risks 
from the information set, performance may be inadequate.  
From the preceding paragraphs it can be seen that there are numerous potential 
outcomes regarding the impact of task-specific experience on the use of stopping rules, the 
determination of whether sufficient and appropriate evidence has been collected and the 
identification of significant risks. These uncertainties are investigated in the following 
research questions. 
Research Question 3a: Is there a relationship between task-specific experience 
and the stopping rule used by auditors? 
Research Question 3b: Is there a relationship between task-specific experience 
and the evidence set collected? 
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Research Question 3c: Is there a relationship between task-specific experience 
and the identification of significant risks? 
3.4. The impact of decision aids – checklists 
The presence of a decision aid potentially affects the effort-accuracy trade-off made 
by the auditor. The decision aid has the potential to reduce the effort the auditor must expend 
in deciding whether to stop the search but may increase the effort required to apply the 
decision aid if it requires a lot of evidence to be collected. The accuracy of the decision aid 
will also have an impact. If the auditor believes that the decision aid is more accurate than 
their own stopping rule, or if its application is “safer” than using the auditor’s own potentially 
less defensible stopping rule, then using the decision aid becomes more attractive.  
Research indicates that auditors are often reluctant to rely on decision aids 
(Abdolmohammadi 1991; Boatsman, Moeckel, and Pei 1997; Eining, Jones, and Loebbecke 
1997). In contrast, Glover, Prawitt, and Spilker (1997) report that auditors over-rely on a 
checklist decision aid, even when they know that it is inaccurate. Their results indicate that 
when an auditor is given a checklist, the auditor adopts a strategy of effort-minimisation, 
possibly at the expense of the quality of the judgment or decision made. This is contrary to 
the aim of decision aids to reduce cognitive load on users so that more effort can be devoted 
to making the judgment. Thus the decision aid may replace the auditor’s own stopping rule 
because it minimises the cognitive effort that the auditor must expend.  
There are a number of potential disadvantages associated with using checklists in an 
unstructured task like identifying significant risks. Checklists are highly structured and may 
not fit with the task environment resulting in diminished effectiveness (Glover, Prawitt, and 
Spilker 1997), possibly because of the irrelevant evidence it may introduce (Asare and 
Wright 2004). They are also not designed to detect risks from patterns, instead directing a 
tick-the-box mentality (Asare and Wright 2004).  
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Hence a checklist may result in insufficient evidence if it replaces the auditor’s 
stopping rule. It may have a positive impact if it supplements the auditors’ stopping rule. 
Alternatively, the auditor may choose to ignore the decision aid altogether and continue using 
their own preferred stopping rule. 
As a supplement, the auditor will continue to use their selected stopping rule while 
using the checklist to double check the information they have already collected, either at the 
beginning, during or at the end of the information search. It may prompt them to collect 
information that they had not considered.  
If the checklist is a substitute for the auditor’s own stopping rule, the auditor will 
blindly collect information on the checklist without considering if any additional information 
may be missing. The evidence set is likely to be large and may be sufficient, but the auditor is 
less likely to have engaged with the evidence and may simply skim read the information to 
try and identify the significant risks. Alternatively, the auditor, as part of their effort-accuracy 
trade-off, may decide to conserve cognitive effort during the information search process by 
using only the checklist, but use that conserved effort later when evaluating the information 
to identify the significant risks. There is greater risk in this study that the evidence will be 
inappropriately evaluated. 
Finally, if the checklist is ignored, then the decision aid will have no impact on the 
judgments related to the sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence. The uncertainty with 
regard to the influence of the decision aid (checklist) on stopping rule selection, stopping rule 
application, and the significant risks identified is investigated in the following research 
questions. 
Research Question 4a:  Is there a relationship between the presence of a 
checklist and the stopping rules used by auditors? 
Research Question 4b: Is there a relationship between the presence of a 
checklist and the evidence set collected? 
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Research Question 4c: Is there a relationship between the presence of a 
checklist and the identification of significant risks by auditors? 
3.5. Interaction between task-specific experience and checklist 
Auditors with greater task-specific experience may decide not to use a checklist 
because they may be more confident in their own internal stopping rules. If they decide to use 
the checklist, then it may be a supplement to their own stopping rule, possibly acting as a 
memory-jogger (Eining, Jones, and Loebbecke 1997). Their own stopping rule may also 
direct them to information that may not be requested by the checklist. Auditors with less task-
specific experience may be more likely to rely on a firm-provided checklist because their 
stopping rules may be less developed. They may have less confidence in their own stopping 
rules. They may also be unable to detect an inadequacy in a checklist. This poses the greatest 
danger as insufficient evidence will be collected.  
Research Question 5a:  Does the presence of a checklist influence the 
relationship between task-specific experience and the stopping rule used by 
auditors?  
Research Question 5b: Does the presence of a checklist influence the 
relationship between task-specific experience and the evidence set collected? 
Research Question 5c: Does the presence of a checklist influence the 
relationship between task-specific experience and the identification of significant 
risks? 
4. Research method 
The research on stopping rules in general is in the exploratory stages. To further 
facilitate this exploration, think aloud verbal protocol methodology was employed. The use of 
verbal protocol analysis allows us to benefit from the large and rich data set generated by this 
method. It also permits a more direct examination of the stopping rules employed without 
having to rely exclusively on participants’ self insight. 
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4.1. Participants 
Participants were ten Managers and ten Seniors from Big 4 and second tier accounting 
firms in Sydney, Australia. On average, seniors had 5.25 years of audit experience while 
managers had on average 6.65 years of experience. All participants reported that they had 
previous experience in identifying significant risks as part of the planning phase of the audit. 
An important feature of this paper is the number and seniority of the participants who 
completed the research materials and provided detailed verbal protocols for analysis. 
Participants were provided with a $30 gift voucher in appreciation for their involvement in 
the study. 
4.2. Task and experimental procedures 
A requirement of the case employed in this study was that it be sufficiently large so as 
to allow participants the opportunity to activate a stopping rule. Too small a case and 
participants would not need a stopping rule, choosing instead to look at everything provided 
to them. To construct the case, an Australian listed wine producer was used as a foundation. 
Financial statements, newspaper articles and other publicly available information were 
collected. Any identifying information such as company or personnel names were changed 
and financial information was scaled to reduce the possibility of recognition. In total, the case 
comprised 89 workpapers (124 pages). The workpapers were provided in an indexed folder. 
The folder of information given to participants was organised into four distinct 
sections – financial information, company information, industry information and newspaper 
articles. Within the company information, workpapers were ordered alphabetically. The 
newspaper articles were ordered by date (oldest to newest). Each workpaper was cross-
referenced to any other workpapers that were related to the topic. This was performed 
because cross-referencing is commonly used by auditors to navigate audit documentation. 
The case materials were extensively pilot tested on academic colleagues with audit 
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experience and audit practitioners. In particular, the audit practitioners indicated that the 
materials were representative, both in terms of volume and contents of those that would be 
available to auditors identifying significant risks in practice. 
Due to their proprietary nature, Big 4 audit firms were not prepared to give 
permission for their audit checklists to be used in our study. Therefore, a generic checklist 
was developed using Appendix 1 contained in ISA 315 (IAASB 2007b) which recommends a 
number of areas that auditors should investigate to gather an understanding of the client 
sufficient to allow the identification of significant risks. Key items from the appendix were 
identified and included in our checklist under the headings of: external/industry factors, 
nature of the entity, objectives and strategy, financial performance, and internal controls. In 
total, the checklist contained twenty items with each item referenced to the key workpaper in 
the case materials.  
The setting for the case is a pre-tender meeting to be attended by the participant, other 
team members, and the audit partner. The participant was informed that the case company has 
approached the firm to provide a tender for audit services in the future. Prior to the audit firm 
committing to make a presentation to the Board, the participant is assigned the task of 
identifying the significant risks from a folder of information available to them. The 
participant was informed that the significant risks identified would be used in discussions 
amongst senior staff to determine whether the firm should making a presentation and tender 
to the Board of the case company. To clarify the concept of ‘significant risk’, participants 
were also given a definition from ISA 315.109 (IAASB 2007b) and reminded that the partner 
is not interested in reading about every conceivable risk - only the most significant risks that 
would affect the planning and execution of the audit.  
Participants were also informed that they were not required to examine all the 
workpapers in the folder and that they could work through any materials they chose in 
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whatever sequence they desired. The objective was to encourage participants to search for 
information and stop searching for information. Those in the checklist condition were also 
informed that the checklist was a generic one used by the firm and that its use was entirely 
optional. 
The task was performed at the participant’s work place in a conference room or 
office, without noise or distraction. One of the authors was present throughout the entire task 
to provide instructions and clarify any questions the participant may have about the task. 
Standard “think aloud” instructions were given to participants in accordance with Ericsson 
and Simon (1993). To increase the participant’s ability to “think aloud” while completing the 
task and remove any unease at being recorded, a practice task was completed. At any time 
during the task if the participant fell silent for an extended period of time, they were 
reminded to continue thinking aloud with the phrase “keep talking”. At the end of the task 
demographic information, including the participant’s task-specific experience, was collected. 
Those who received the checklist were also requested to answer two questions on the extent 
to which they used the checklist to search for information and to decide when the task was 
complete. Participants were also asked not to discuss the task with their colleagues as data 
collection was ongoing.  
4.3. Variables 
Task-specific experience was manipulated at two levels (Senior and Manager) as was 
checklist (present or absent). The stopping rule employed, which was either an independent 
or dependent variable depending on the research question examined, was a measured 
variable, the details of which are provided below. Task performance was measured as the 
number of significant risks identified. Evidence set characteristics were measured on three 
dimensions; the number, breadth and depth of workpapers acquired. Details of how these 
variables were measured are provided below. 
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4.3.1. Measuring the stopping rules used 
Verbal protocol analysis was used in this study to enable the stopping rule(s) used by 
participants to be identified. The protocols were transcribed verbatim by a transcription 
professional and then closely reviewed by one of the authors in conjunction with the original 
audio. Once they were satisfied that the transcripts were accurate, they were parsed into 
episodes. An episode is the smallest unit of thought or cognition. 
Traditionally, operators used to code verbal protocol transcripts fall into three 
categories – inputs, processing and outputs. Input operators are associated with acquiring 
information from the materials given. Output operators are associated with the decision to be 
made in the task (in this case, the decision that a particular item is a significant risk or 
deciding that the task is at an end). Processing involves any form of information 
transformation – using mental functions on information acquired in order to get to the output. 
A stopping rule is a cognitive process whereby the participant is determining whether they 
have sufficient and appropriate evidence. Therefore, stopping rules will most likely be seen in 
the ‘processing’ operators2. Coding of the protocol episodes proceeded in two stages. Stage 1 
identified the processing operators and Stage 2 coded the processing operators in light of the 
stopping rules they were consistent with. 
Operators for Stage 1 of the coding scheme were developed based on the commonly 
used categories of inputs, processing and outputs. Some operators were obtained from the 
existing applicable literature. Protocols from the pilot studies were examined and as many 
episodes as possible coded from the existing literature. Any episodes that did not fit an 
existing operator were examined in an emergent approach and new operators developed. The 
Stage 1 coding scheme was also tested for clarity and to identify any descriptions that were 
                                                 
2 It is likely that the way a participant acquires information (inputs) may also be reflective of the stopping rule 
used. However, data collected in the verbal protocols and the structure of the task are not sufficient to identify 
the stopping rule based on search strategy.  
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ambiguous through the use of a test coder. The test coder was given the coding scheme and 
asked to code the protocol from one of the pilot studies. The researcher then compared their 
coding with that of the test coder – differences were analyzed and the coding scheme 
clarified. The Stage 1 coding was developed and extensively tested before the Stage 2 coding 
was developed. 
Operators for Stage 2 of the coding scheme were developed from the literature on 
stopping rules. The threshold stopping rules focus on reaching some predetermined amount 
of evidence – so as information is acquired, the participant will comment on how it impacts 
the amount they are seeking to collect. The mental model stopping rule is based on building a 
mental picture of the firm – so as information is acquired, the participant should display 
behaviour consistent with linking that information with that which they already know and 
forming conclusions based on that information. The mental list stopping rule is based on the 
search for specific information. It is related to a checklist rather than evidence that has been 
acquired or an evolving understanding of the entity. As such, processing consistent with a 
mental list stopping rule will not exhibit any reference to previous evidence or understanding 
of the entity. 
Coding for both Stage 1 and Stage 2 was undertaken by one of the authors. In order to 
test the reliability of the coding, all of the protocols were independently coded and revealed 
that the initial coding was reliable. Any disagreements between coders were resolved and 
analysis is based on the final agreed upon coding. 
4.3.2. Measure of task performance 
Participants were required to identify the significant risks that would affect the 
planning of the audit. The performance of the task by participants is measured by the number 
of significant risks identified. Seven significant risks were identified by the researcher and 
auditing faculty involved in the pilot testing prior to the data being collected. A review of the 
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risks identified by participants completing the task revealed no further unidentified 
significant risks. 
4.3.3. Evidence set characteristics 
Three characteristics of the evidence set were calculated – the total number of 
workpapers acquired, the breadth of workpapers acquired and the depth of workpapers 
acquired (Asare, Trompeter, and Wright 2000). The protocol episodes coded as inputs were 
matched with the workpaper containing the information acquired. The total number of 
workpapers is based on a count of the unique (individual) workpapers referred to in the 
protocol. This does not count duplicates – for example, four lines of protocol where the 
participant is reading from a single workpaper is counted as only one workpaper. The breadth 
of workpapers acquired was based on how many of the eight categories of workpapers were 
covered by the workpapers acquired. The categories were from ISA 315 (IAASB 2007b) 
which identifies eight major categories of potential information that auditors may need to 
acquire to obtain an understanding of the client sufficient to identify the significant risks3. 
Each workpaper was allocated to one of these eight categories. As long as at least one 
workpaper under a category was acquired, this category was considered to have been covered 
when measuring this variable. The depth of workpapers acquired took into consideration the 
number of workpapers and was calculated as the proportion of all workpapers under that 
category that were acquired.  
                                                 
3 The eight categories were Industry, Regulatory and Other External Factors; Measurement and Review of the 
Entity's Financial Performance; Nature of the Entity – Business Operations; Nature of the Entity – Financing; 
Nature of the Entity – Financial Reporting; Nature of the Entity – Investments; Nature of the Entity – 
Ownership and Governance Arrangements; and Objectives and Strategies and Related Business Risks. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics reported by experience (rank) and checklist (present or absent) 
are reported in Table 1.  
<Insert Table 1 here> 
The number of words in each verbal protocol reveals that participants took the task 
seriously and this was also the impression given to the author involved in collecting, 
transcribing and coding the verbal protocols. On average, participants reviewed half of the 
available workpapers and covered most of the eight breadth categories of evidence. 
Participants however generally only identified fewer than half of the seven significant risks.  
In general, most participants worked through the folder of workpapers sequentially – 
starting at the financial statements. It was common for participants to use the financial 
statements to identify accounts balances that looked unusual and then be vigilant for 
information on these account balances while working through the folder. For some risks, but 
particularly for related party transactions, a number of participants immediately identified a 
significant risk after reading a single workpaper – indicative of a mental list stopping rule. 
Another common process displayed by participants was the conduct of a recap of all the 
significant risks they identified and the placing of those risks in the context of the client, 
indicative of a mental model stopping rule.  
Stage 2 coding of the protocols (identification of processing consistent with the three 
stopping rules) revealed that participants generally used all three stopping rules (threshold, 
mental model and mental list) to varying degrees in order to complete the task. Consistent 
with present auditing standards and practice, extensive use is made of the mental model 
stopping rule. 
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Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the proportion of processing consistent with 
each of the three stopping rules. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
5.2. Research Question 1 – the impact of stopping rules on evidence 
Research Question 1 was concerned with a potential relationship between the choice 
of stopping rule and the quality of the evidence set generated. As noted above, the protocol 
data revealed that participants did not use a single stopping rule in the completion of the task, 
choosing instead to use a combination of the three stopping rules. One consistency identified 
was the fact that all participants used the mental model stopping rule to some degree – from 
42% of their processing to 95%. In light of the extensive use of the mental model stopping 
rule, analysis of the relationships between stopping rule and evidence set characteristics was 
based primarily on the proportion of processing reflective of a mental model stopping rule. 
Table 3 reports Pearson correlation coefficients examining the relationship between 
the proportion of the mental model stopping rule processing and characteristics of the 
evidence set generated. 
<Insert Table 3 here>  
Our data revealed no statistically significant relationship between the proportion of 
processing consistent with a mental model stopping rule and the total number of workpapers 
examined (r =.334, two-tailed p = .151), breadth of workpapers (r =.333, two-tailed p = .151) 
or the depth of workpapers (two-tailed p >.10 for all eight categories except for financial 
reporting)4.  
                                                 
4 We also analyzed our data using the proportion of processing consistent with the threshold stopping rules and 
the mental list stopping rules. Although results relating to the threshold stopping rule were consistent with those 
for mental model, the proportion of mental list processing was negatively correlated with the total number of 
workpapers (r =-.497, two-tailed p = .026) and the depth of workpapers examined for half of the eight 
workpaper categories (two-tailed p <.05) 
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We also split our sample at the median (77% of processing) to compare the evidence 
set of those participants revealing high and low levels of processing consistent with a mental 
model stopping rule. These results are consistent with the correlation analysis. There were no 
statistically significant differences between those high and low in mental model stopping rule 
processing (all two-tailed p >.10). 
Whilst there is the possibility that use of the mental list stopping rule will result in a 
inferior evidence set, the results of this analysis are generally consistent with the 
understanding that the choice of stopping rule does not influence the quality of the evidence 
set on which auditors make judgments. 
5.3. Research Question 2 – the impact of stopping rules on identifying significant risks 
Research Question 2 was concerned with a potential relationship between the choice 
of stopping rule and the number of significant risks identified. The Pearson correlation co-
efficient reporting the strength of the relationship between the proportion of the mental model 
stopping rule processing and the number of significant risks identified was positive and 
significant (r = .447, p = .048). Greater use of the mental model stopping rule is associated 
with superior performance in the identification of significant risks. Analysis based on the 
median split of the proportion of mental model stopping rule processing did not reveal any 
statistically significant differences in the number of significant risks identified between those 
with high levels (mean: 2.78 risks) and low levels (mean: 3.36 risks) of mental model 
stopping rule processing (t = -.752, p = .462). Although not conclusive, the results are 
consistent with the understanding that the mental model stoping rule leads to superior 
performance. Considered together with the results from Research Question 1, it appears that 
while a choice of stopping rule does not influence the acquisition of evidence items, it does 
impact on the effectiveness with which that evidence set is evaluated and interpreted. 
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5.4. Research Question 3 – the impact of task-specific experience 
Research Question 3 was concerned with the potential relationship between task-
specific experience (that is, past experience in the identification of significant risks) and the 
use of particular stopping rules, evidence set characteristics, and task performance. Recall 
that participants indicated the number of times they had previously completed an 
identification of significant risk task within four bands: 1-5 times, 6-10 times, 11-15 times, 
and more than 15 times. Table 4 reports descriptive statistics across the four levels of task-
specific experience. 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
A one-way ANOVA revealed that there was a relationship between task-specific 
experience and the proportion of processing consistent with the mental model stopping rule 
(F = 10.138, p =.001). There is no evidence to support a relationship between task-specific 
experience and the breadth of workpapers acquired (F = 1.443, p = .267) however there is a 
marginally significant relationship with the number of significant risks identified (F = 2.933, 
p = .065). Post hoc Tukey, Gabriel and Hochberg tests reveal no significant differences 
between any of the groups in pairwise tests. 
Although not the focus of a specific research question, it is useful to note that task-
specific experience also may affect how a participant executed or used the stopping rule. For 
example, Participant 2 (a manager having previously completed between one and five 
significant risk exercises) identified six of seven significant risks using the mental model 
stopping rule (95% of processing consistent with the mental model stopping rule). In 
comparison, Participants 10 and 12 (seniors having previously completed between ten and 
fifteen and more than fifteen significant risk exercises respectively) also used the mental 
model stopping rule (85% and 93% of processing respectively) but only identified three out 
of seven significant risks. 
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5.5. Research Question 4 – the impact of a checklist 
In Research Question 4, it was posited that a checklist, if present, may override or 
otherwise interfere with a participant’s preferred stopping rule. None of participants in the 
study blindly followed the checklist. Of the nine participants given the checklist, only four 
referred the checklist during the task (one Manager and three Seniors) – and of those only 
three actually used it (one Senior reviewed the checklist at the start of the task and then did 
not use it). Given the limited extent to which the checklist was used by those who received it, 
it was not surprising to find no statistically significant differences between those provided 
with and those not provided with the checklist in terms of proportion of processing consistent 
with the mental model stopping rule (t = -.641, two-tailed p = .530), number of workpapers (t 
= -.032, two-tailed p = .975), breadth of workpapers (t = 1.342, two-tailed p = .196) and 
number of significant risks identified (t = .281, two-tailed p = .782). The verbal protocol data 
revealed that participants that did use the checklist during the task did so at the end of the 
task. It appears they were using the checklist as a memory aid to ensure they did not miss 
anything during their own investigations (Eining, Jones, and Loebbecke 1997).  
One possible reason why the checklist had very little impact is that the task may not 
be suited to the use of a checklist. Identifying significant risks is a highly unstructured task 
and participants may not have felt comfortable using a checklist in that situation. One 
participant began the task by looking at the checklist items but after examining the first three 
items, discarded it in favour of their own approach. The other participants who were provided 
with the, but didn’t use, the checklist given to them briefly glanced at the checklist without 
making comment. Interestingly, another participant indicated that the checklist provided was 
similar to that used in their firm, but still chose not to use it.  
It would seem that a checklist is not particularly useful in this situation and its 
presence did not appear to interfere with the participants’ preferred approach. In our 
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discussion surrounding research question 4, we were concerned that auditors (especially 
inexperienced auditors) would see the checklist as a ‘safer’ option than using their own 
potentially inferior stopping rule. The lack of accountability in the current study may have 
worked against us finding any checklist effect. 
5.6. Research Question 5 – the interaction between task-specific experience and a 
checklist 
Research Question 5 was concerned with a potential interaction between task-specific 
experience and the presence of a checklist in influencing the use of particular stopping rules, 
the characteristics of the evidence set, and/or the identification of significant risks. A 2x2 
ANOVA revealed no statistically significant interaction between the presence of a checklist 
and hierarchical position (rank) in terms of the proportion of processing consistent with the 
mental model stopping rule (F = 0.285, p = .601), total number of workpapers (F = 0.921, p = 
.351) or breadth of workpaper categories (F = 2.612, p = .126).  
The raw results for significant risks identified reveal a potential interaction between 
the variables of interest. Seniors identified more risks in the absence of the checklist (mean 
2.8) than when the checklist was present (mean 2.0). The opposite was the case for managers. 
Managers identified more risks when the checklist was present (mean 4.8) than when it was 
absent (mean 3.2). The interaction, however, was not statistically significant (F = 2.899, p = 
.108).  
Surprisingly, Managers appear to perform better when they have the checklist 
available to them. The one manager who used the checklist did so as a memory aid at the end 
of the task (Eining, Jones, and Loebbecke 1997) to consolidate their thoughts on what items 
may be significant risks. This participant stated: “Okay. Let’s go through the checklist now 
that’s been prepared by us and see if there’s anything else that we need to worry about.” 
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Analysis of the protocols however did not show any additional significant risks being 
identified with the use of the checklist.  
In any case, the limited extent to which the checklists were used, despite their 
availability, limits the extent to which we can draw conclusions on this research question.  
5.7. Sensitivity analysis 
One reason for the choice a wine producer as the context for the case in this study was 
to minimise the impact of any potential industry experience or specialisation. Given the 
location of the participants (that is, Sydney Australia) it was anticipated that very few, if any, 
would have wine industry experience. However, other industry specialisation effects may be 
present – specifically financial services. Auditors with a financial services industry 
specialisation do not come into contact with issues surrounding inventory (one of the 
significant risks in the task) and therefore, may have had more difficulty with the task than 
those with manufacturing experience. To investigate this, we re-ran all statistical tests after 
excluding the three participants whose specialisation was related to financial services (for 
example – banking, and insurance specialisations). Exclusion of these participants did not 
change statistical inferences or conclusions reported above. Interestingly, two participants did 
have experience in the alcoholic beverage industry. One participant was a Senior and had 
previously audited a major international beverage company – however, this participant did 
not identify the write-down of inventory as a significant risk. The other participant was a 
Manager and had audited a distilled spirits importer and distributor and did identify inventory 
as a significant risk. 
6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
Motivated by the importance of stopping rules in audit judgment and the lack of 
understanding surrounding the use of stopping rules in audit settings, this study used 
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experienced auditors and verbal protocol analysis to inform an understanding of the way in 
which stopping rules are used and the factors that may influence their effective use. Analysis 
of the verbal protocol data revealed that auditors primarily use the mental model stopping 
rule when identifying significant risks for a potential audit client. However, unlike previous 
research where participants appear to be using only one stopping rule (Browne and Pitts 
2004; Nickles, Curley, and Benson 1995) – auditors in this study appear to be using the 
mental model in conjunction with another stopping rule (either threshold or mental list). It is 
possible that in a smaller task or one that is more structured, auditors may, consistent with 
prior research, revert to using a single stopping rule. 
Although our results are consistent with the understanding that the choice of stopping 
rule employed does not influence the evidence set generated, use of the mental model 
stopping rule seems to assist in the effective interpretation of this evidence set. The level of 
task-specific experience was found to influence the extent to which a mental model stopping 
rule is employed. These results provide evidence that auditors are meeting the requirements 
of ISA 315 (IAASB 2007b) by using more of a mental model based approach to build their 
understanding of the client.  
In such an unstructured task, our data revealed that auditors either ignore a checklist 
or use it as a memory aid supplementing their own stopping rule – going through checklist 
items at the end of the task to ensure that no potential areas of risk have been omitted. There 
was no evidence of auditors blindly following checklists, providing evidence that audit firms 
are training staff in a more appropriate methodology than anecdotal reports of blind 
obedience. These results must, however, be interpreted with regard to the fact that if 
participants were held accountable for their judgments, there may have been greater 
incentives to employ the ‘safe’ option stopping rule available with the use of the checklist. 
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Not withstanding the important conclusions that we are able to draw from such a rich 
data set, the findings of the study do need to be interpreted with reference to its limitations. It 
is possible that not all cognitive processes undertaken by the participant in the conduct of the 
task have been verbalised. This, however, does not nullify the validity of the data that has 
been collected but may draw into question the completeness of the data (Ericsson and Simon 
1993). Although large when compared to other protocol studies in the auditing literature, our 
sample of ten Managers and ten Seniors limits the power of our statistical analysis. Verbal 
protocols are a time and labour intensive research tool and a larger sample size was not 
feasible. 
The analysis of such a rich data set in the present study provides the foundation for 
future research, not only more specifically focusing the investigation of stopping rules, but 
also more informatively interpreting any results there from. While current audit research 
primarily focuses on the interpretation of an evidence set, there is a need to examine how that 
evidence set is generated. In this regard, the selection and application of a stopping rule is of 
vital importance. We hope that this study not only informs an understanding of the way in 
which stopping rules are used by auditors, but also encourages others to investigate this 
critical area of audit judgment. 
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Table 1 – Summary of descriptive statistics – mean, standard deviation and range 
 Senior Manager Total 
 Mean Std dev Range Mean Std dev Range Mean Std dev Range 
Checklist n = 5 n = 4 n = 9 
Number of 
words1 
2978.8 2200.07 1162 – 
6461 
2871.25 944.14 1709 – 
3690 




47 20.58 29 – 82 43 13.11 26 – 56 45.2 16.75 26 – 82 
Breadth of 
evidence3 










2 1.414 1 – 4 4.75 0.957 4 – 6  3.222 1.856 1 – 6 
No checklist n = 5 n = 6 n = 11 
Number of 
words 
3479.2 2609.7 924 – 
7678 
3665.5 1747.84 1684 – 
6302 




39.8 12.97 24 – 56 50.17 17.36 30 – 71 45.5 15.72 24 – 71 
Breadth of 
evidence 
7.6 0.55 7 – 8 8 0 8 – 8 7.8 0.40 7 – 8  
Depth of 
evidence 
46% 28% 0-100% 57% 24% 13-
100% 




2.8 1.789 1 – 5 3.167 1.722 1 – 5 3 1.673 1 – 5 
Total n = 10 n = 10 n = 20 
Number of 
words 
3229 2290.8 924 – 
7678 
3347.8 1470.6 1684 – 
6302 




43.4 16.7 24 – 82 47.3 15.44 26 – 71 45.35 15.76 24 – 82 
Breadth of 
evidence 
7.8 0.42 7 – 8 8 0 8 – 8 7.9 0.31 7 – 8 
Depth of 
evidence 
50% 28% 0-100% 55% 28% 13-
100% 




2.4 1.567 1 – 5 3.8 1.619 1 – 6 3.1 1.714 1 – 6 
1 Number of words in verbal protocol 
2 Evidence acquired is the number of unique workpapers examined during the conduct of the 
task. In total there were 89 workpapers available to participants. 
3 Breadth of evidence reports how many of the eight different categories of workpapers were 
acquired. 
4 Depth of evidence reports the average percentage of how many workpapers within each of 
the eight different categories were acquired. 
5Significant risks identified reports how many of the seven significant risks were identified 
by the participants in the conduct of the task 
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics on the proportional processing consistent with each 
stopping rule 
 Senior Manager Total 
 Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range 
 
Checklist n = 5 n = 4 n = 9 
Threshold 7.15% 4.35 - 13.25% 9.36% 1.82 - 15.28% 8.13% 1.82 - 15.28% 
Mental Model 69.35% 50 - 84.78% 77.13% 64.02 - 
95.45% 
72.81% 50 - 95.45% 
Mental List 11.01% 0 - 23.48% 5.95% 1.82 - 8.77% 8.76% 0 - 23.48% 
 
No checklist n = 5 n = 6 n = 11 
Threshold 8.45% 2.02 - 25.00% 8.97% 3.77 - 13.89% 8.73% 2.02 - 25% 
Mental Model 75.96% 41.67 - 
92.94% 
77.15% 70.12 - 
88.72% 
76.61% 41.67 - 
92.94% 
Mental List 10.49% 1.76 - 29.17% 10.64% 1.03 - 17.07% 10.57% 1.03 - 29.17% 
 
Total n = 10 n = 10 n = 20 
Threshold 7.8% 2.02 - 25% 9.13% 1.82 - 15.28% 8.46% 1.82 - 25% 
Mental Model 72.66% 41.67 - 
92.94% 
77.14% 64.02 - 
95.45% 
74.90% 41.67 - 
95.45% 
Mental List 10.75% 0 - 29.17% 8.76% 1.03 - 17.07% 9.76% 0 - 29.17% 
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Table 3 – Pearson correlation coefficients for the percentage of processing consistent 
with a mental model stopping rule 
 
 Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
Total number of workpapers examined r = .334 
p = .151 
Breadth of workpapers examined r = 0.333 
p = .151 
Depth of workpapers examined  
External/industry r = .219 
p =  .353 
Financial performance r = .198 
p =  .402 
Business operations r = .341 
p =  .141 
Financial reporting r = .460* 
p = .041 
Financing r = .353 
p = .147 
Investments r = .258 
p = .272 
Ownership/governance r = .249 
p = .290 
Objectives/strategy r = .202 
p = .394 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics using the number of times the participant has 
undertaken an identification of significant risks as a measure of task-specific experience 






Mean 41.667 8 3.667 
Std dev 12.423 0 2.517 
1-5 times 
n = 3 
Range 34 – 56 8 – 8 1 – 6 
Mean 26.5 7.5 1 
Std dev 3.536 0.707 0 
6-10 times 
n = 2 
Range 24 – 29 7 – 8 1 – 1 
Mean 51.5 8 2.25 
Std dev 20.782 0 1.5 
11-15 times 
n = 4 
Range 38 – 82 8 – 8 1 – 4 
Mean 47.546 7.910 3.637 
Std dev 14.672 .302 1.433 
15+ times 
n = 11 
Range 26 – 71 7-8 1 - 5 
 
 
